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Flag Burning and the Constitution
Geoffrey R. Stone*
I will consider four questions in this essay: First, was the decision in
Texas v. Johnson' correct? Second, is it possible to draft legislation that
prohibits flag burning without running afoul of Johnson? Third, is it
possible to draft legislation that prohibits flag burning without running
afoul of the first amendment? 2 And fourth, should we amend the Constitution to overrule Johnson? In short, my answers are yes, yes, possibly, and
no.

In Johnson,3 the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute that
prohibited any person from desecrating the American flag by defacing,
damaging or otherwise physically mistreating it "in a way that the actor
knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or
discover his action,"4 as applied to an individual who publicly burned the
flag as a form of political protest. 5 The Court's decision in Johnson was
premised upon a sound understanding of well-settled principles of first
amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, Johnson followed quite sensibly from
some of the most basic, most firmly established, and most well-reasoned
precepts of American constitutional law.
At the outset, it is useful to note thatJohnson was not the Court's first
encounter with government efforts to command respect for the flag by
restricting expression. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,6 the
Court held that a state could not constitutionally punish a student for
refusing to salute the flag. In Street v. New York, 7 the Court held that a state
could not constitutionally punish an individual for speaking contemptuously about the flag. In Smith v. Goguen,8 the Court held that a state could
not constitutionally punish an individual for treating the flag contemptuously by wearing a replica of the flag sewn to the seat of his pants. The
Court, in Spence v. Washington,9 held that a state could not constitutionally
punish an individual for misuse of the flag by affixing to the flag a large
*Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law and Dean, The University of Chicago Law School. I
would like to thank Robert Clinton, Larry Kramer, Michael McConnell, Richard Posner, David
Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.
1. 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989).
2. The first amendment states in its relevant part that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend. I.
3. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
4. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(b) (Vernon 1989); see Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537 n.1.
5. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. at 2536-37.
6. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
7. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
8. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
9. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
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peace symbol made of removable tape. Although none of these decisions
dealt directly with flag burning, they set the stage for Johnson.
The Johnson decision was based upon a critical distinction in first
amendment doctrine. Central to the Court's reasoning was the question
whether the Texas statute was "related" or "unrelated" to the suppression
of free expression. This distinction, first articulated in United States v.
O'Brien,10 reflects an effort to distinguish between those laws that are
designed to restrict speech and those that have only an incidental effect on
speech. The premise of this distinction is that, from a first amendment
perspective, the former are more problematic than the latter."
For purposes of this distinction, a law is "related to the suppression of
free expression" if it (a) explicitly restricts speech, or (b) does not explicitly
restrict speech, but is justified by reference to interests that are directly
related to the restriction of speech, or (c) does not explicitly restrict speech,
but restricts expressive conduct because of the reactions of others to the
content of the message conveyed. A law is "unrelated to the suppression of
free expression" if it (a) does not explicitly restrict speech, and (b) is not
justified by reference to interests that are directly related to the restriction
of speech, and (c) does not restrict expressive conduct because of the
reactions of others to the content of the message conveyed.
It may help if I offer a few illustrations. A law that prohibits any
person from making any speech in a public park is "related to the
suppression of free expression" because it explicitly restricts speech. A law
that prohibits any loud noises in a public park in order to shield users of the
park from offensive speech is "related to the suppression of free expression" because it is justified by reference to interests that are directly related
to the restriction of speech. And a law that prohibits any loud noises in a
public park that may trigger a riot is "related to the suppression of free
expression" because it restricts expressive conduct because of the reactions
of others to the content of the message conveyed.
On the other hand, a law that prohibits any person from driving in
excess of 55 miles per hour is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression," even as applied to an individual who speeds in order to get to
a political rally or to express his dissatisfaction with speed limits, because
such a law does not explicitly restrict speech, it is not justified by reference
to interests that are directly related to the restriction of-speech, and it does
not restrict expressive conduct because of the reactions of others to the
content of the message conveyed.
This distinction was critical in Johnson because it was the-ground upon
which the Court distinguished its prior decision in O'Brien, in which the
Court upheld a conviction for draft card burning. At first glance, O'Brien
seemed the obviously controlling precedent. After all, if the government
can punish an individual who publicly burns a draft card as a form of
symbolic expression, it would seem to follow that it can also punish an
individual who publicly burns an American flag as a form of symbolic
expression.

10. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
11. See Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 105-14 (1987).
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In O'Brien, the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting any person
to forge, alter, knowingly destroy, or knowingly mutilate a draft card, 12 as
applied to an individual who publicly burned his draft card as an act of
political protest.'5 In reaching this decision, the Court explained that the
draft card statute had only an incidental effect on speech because it did not
explicitly regulate expression, its asserted purpose-to facilitate the administration of the selective service laws-was unrelated to the restriction of
speech, and it applied to all violators without regard to whether they had
engaged in expressive conduct and without regard to the communicative
impact of their expression. 14 The Court concluded that, in such circumstances, the law was "unrelated to the suppression of free expression" and
thus should be tested by a relatively deferential standard of review. 15
In Johnson the Court held that, unlike the draft card statute at issue in
O'Brien, the Texas statute was not "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.'" To the contrary, the Court explained that "[t]he Texas law is
. . . not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all
circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others."' 7 Thus, unlike the
situation in O'Brien, "Johnson's treatment of the flag violated Texas law"
18
because of "the likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct."'
The Court concluded that, in such circumstances, the Texas law was not a
mere incidental restriction of speech, but was directly "related to the
suppression of free expression."' 9
Although this analysis served effectively to distinguish O'Brien, it did
not in itself mandate the invalidation of the challenged statute, for not all
laws that are "related to the suppression of free expression" are unconstitutional. To the contrary, within the realm of laws that are "related to the
suppression of free expression" there is a further distinction between those
that are content-neutral and those that are content-based.
Content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to the
content of the message conveyed. Laws that prohibit noisy speeches near a
hospital, ban billboards in residential communities, or restrict the distribution of leaflets in public places are examples of content-neutral restrictions.
Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, limit expression because of
the message conveyed. Laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the publication of confidential information, or restrict speeches that may trigger a
hostile audience response illustrate this type of restriction. Content-based
restrictions are especially problematic under the first amendment, for by
restricting only some messages and not others such laws are especially likely
to distort the substantive content of public debate and to mutilate the
12. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375.
13. Id. at 369.
14. Id. at 376-80.
15. Id. at 377.
16. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989) (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
17. Id. at 2543.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2542.
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thought processes of the community. Thus, unlike content-neutral restrictions, which are generally subject to a form of ad hoc balancing, content20
based laws are presumptively invalid.
As the Court recognized inJohnson, the Texas flag desecration statute
was explicitly content-based. 2' Indeed, the Texas law directly violated the
"bedrock" first amendment principle "that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable. '22 The Court thus concluded that this "contentbased" restriction could withstand constitutional challenge only if the state's
'23
interest could survive "the most exacting scrutiny.
In my judgment, the Court's analysis of O'Brien and of the Texas flag
desecration statute was clearly correct and essentially uncontroversial as a
matter of both precedent and principle. Nonetheless, several arguments
have been advanced in opposition to Johnson.
First, it has been suggested thatJohnson's act of burning the American
flag as a form of political protest was not "speech" within the meaning of
the first amendment. On this view, the first amendment protects only
written and spoken communication. At least since its 1928 decision in
Stromberg v. California,24 however, the Court has rejected this crabbed view
of the first amendment, and rightly so. Any act that is intended to
communicate and is reasonably understood by others as communication
should fall within the first amendment's protection of "speech." 25 This
includes not only the written and spoken word, but sign language for the
deaf, picketing, 26 parading, 27 the wearing of black armbands, 28 and the
public burning of the American flag. Indeed, because of its unique emotive
power, symbolic expression is often an especially effective means of
conveying the depth of one's convictions.
Most of the perplexity traditionally associated with the issue of
symbolic expression was due to the relative rigidity of first amendment
doctrine in the early stages of its evolution. Consider the difficulty of
attempting to integrate unconventional means of expression into a doctrinal structure that tests all restrictions of speech with a single, overarching
standard, such as "dear and present danger. '29 Such "expressive" acts as
20. For a more thorough discussion of this distinction, see Stone, supra note 11; Stone,

Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm.&Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983).
21. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. at 2543.
22. Id.at 2544.

23. Id. at 2543.
24. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
25. See id. at 368-69 (holding free speech clause of first amendment applicable to Young
Communist League member who displayed red flag in public place).
26. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (state law prohibiting all union picketing

unconstitutional).

27. See Edwards Y.South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (peaceful parade through South
Carolina State House grounds to protest segregation laws protected by first amendment).
28. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (high
school students wearing black armbands to protest Vietnam War protected by first amendment).
29. This test is found in an opinion by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
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urinating on a public building or publicly letting the air out of the tires of
a government official's car in symbolic protest of government policy would
strain such a doctrinal structure to the breaking point. Is the interest in
preventing public urination or minor acts of vandalism of sufficient
"gravity" to satisfy the clear and present danger standard? If so, we run the
risk of diluting a standard that must protect free speech against government efforts to censor seditious libel and subversive advocacy. If not, does
that mean that society must tolerate such bizarre forms of expression? The
simplest "solution" in such a doctrinal framework is, of course, to avoid the
problem entirely by defining such expressive conduct as "nonspeech."
Because of the two distinctions discussed above-the "related/univelated" distinction and the "content-based/content-neutral" distinctionsymbolic speech issues are readily manageable under existing first
amendment doctrine. Such issues are now analyzed by asking, first,
whether the challenged restriction is related or unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and, second, if the latter, whether the restriction is
directed at the content of the symbolic expression. The results of these two
inquiries will determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. This more subtle
analysis has enabled first amendment jurisprudence to accommodate a
broader conception of "speech" by focusing more precisely on the specific
dangers associated with different types of restrictions.
Second, it has been argued that the Texas statute might be upheld
under the "fighting words" doctrine.3 0 But that doctrine has no application
in Johnson. The fighting words doctrine governs only personal insults or
epithets that are intended and understood not as communication, but as
verbal assaults; the doctrine contains an implicit requirement of likely and
imminent danger, in that the speech must be likely to cause the average
addressee to fight; and the doctrine applies only to face-to-face encounters
where the speech is directed at a particular, individual addressee. 31 None of
these elements was present in Johnson. Only a dramatic and wholly
unwarranted expansion of this doctrine could justify its application in the
circumstances presented in Johnson.
I Third, it has been suggested that the Texas statute might be sustained
under the "hostile audience" doctrine.3 2 On this view, the government can
prohibit flag desecration because such expressive conduct may cause others
to react in a hostile manner. Whatever vitality this doctrine may retain
beyond the narrow confines of the fighting words doctrine, it has no
bearing on Johnson. Because the hostile audience rationale for suppressing
speech invites what Harry Kalven aptly termed the "heckler's veto,"32 the
Court has long recognized that the government may restrict speech for this
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."). See also Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("dear and imminent
danger" is not posed by a "silly leaflet by an unknown man").
30. For a discussion of the fighting words doctrine, see G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein
& M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 1009-15 (1986), and cases discussed therein.
31. Id.
32. For a discussion of the hostile audience doctrine, see id. at 997-1017.
33. H. Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment 141 (1966).
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reason, if at all, only on a specific factual showing that the danger of violent
audience response is likely, imminent, grave, and beyond the capacity 3of4
government to control with reasonable law enforcement resources.
Johnson was not even remotely such a situation.
Finally, it has been argued that the Texas flag desecration statute
should be understood not as a restriction on the expression of an idea-hostility to the policies of the United States government, but as a restriction on
the use of a potential means of expression-the American flag. To the
extent this argument implies that the Texas flag desecration statute was a
regulation of means rather than content, it is clearly wrong. The Texas
statute restricted the use of the flag as a means of expression only when it
wds used to convey ideas that are "offensive" to others. As the Court
recognized, that is a paradigm example of content-based regulation.3 5
The main thrust of this argument must thus be that the Texas statute
should be exempt from "the most exacting scrutiny" because it did not
totally ban the expression of an idea, but merely restricted its expression
through a single means of communication-flag desecration. For several
quite compelling reasons, however, including the equality principle, the
risk of distorting the substantive content of public debate, the inability
confidently to distinguish between "significant" and "modest" contentbased restrictions, and concerns about impermissible governmental
motivation, 36 the Court has never accepted such a limitation on its scrutiny
of content-based restrictions. Indeed, just as the Court does not dilute its
standard on the ground that a challenged law has only a "modest" rather
than a "significant" effect when it considers the constitutionality of laws that
discriminate against blacks, so too does it eschew such an inquiry when it
considers the constitutionality of laws that discriminate against particular
points of view. Laws that prohibit anti-abortion leafleting on the steps of the
Capitol, or anti-civil rights speeches in the Lincoln Memorial, or anti-war
desecrations of the American flag are appropriately subject to "the most
exacting scrutiny" even though they limit the expression of specific points
of view only through particular means of communication. The evil of such
laws is that they discriminate against specific political viewpoints, without
regard to the relative "severity" of the restriction.
II
Is it possible to draft legislation that restricts flag burning without
running afoul of Johnson? Consider the following statute: "No person may
knowingly impair the physical integrity of the American flag. 3 7 In my view,
Johnson does not dictate the invalidation of this statute.

34.
35.
36.
37.

See G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, supra note 30, at 997-1017.
Texas v. Johnson,109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989).
See Stone, supra note 20, at 200-33.
To make such a law plausible, assume that it defines "American flag" to exclude

anything other than "official" representations of the flag (e.g., made of cloth, of a certain size
and shape, etc.) and that it stipulates some "accepted" method for the ceremonial disposition
of such "official" flags.
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The key point is this: The Court did not hold in Johnson that there is
an inviolable first amendment right to burn the American flag as a means
of political protest. RatherJohnsonwas expressly predicated on the Court's
double-barreled conclusion that the Texas law was related to the suppression of free expression and content-based. Thus, the Court held only that
the specific Texas flag desecration statute before it was an unconstitutional
means of regulating such expressive conduct. As in other circumstances, it
is not simply the nature of the expression, but also "the governmental
interest at stake" and the nature of the regulation that help "to determine
whether a restriction on ...expression is valid."38
A few examples may help to clarify. Suppose an individual is prosecuted for burning an American flag in public as a means of political protest
in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting any person to make an open fire
in a public place. Although Johnson invalidated the Texas flag desecration
statute, it tells us little, if anything, about the constitutionality of this
ordinance, for unlike the Texas statute, the open fires ordinance is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, is not content-based, and
need not be subjected to "the most exacting scrutiny." The constitutionality
of the open fires ordinance is appropriately governed by O'Brien rather
than.Johnson.
Similarly, there can be no doubt that, on the basis of the principles
articulated in O'Brien,, the Court would uphold a statute prohibiting any
person to deface the Lincoln Memorial, even as applied to an individual
who scrawls politically-oriented graffiti on the Memorial. On the other
hand, there also can be no doubt that, on the basis of the principles invoked
in Johnson, the Court would invalidate a statute prohibiting any person to
write "any message critical of the United States" on the Lincoln Memorial.
Although the speech in the two cases is identical, the first law is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression, content-neutral, and constitutional;
whereas the second law, like the Texas statute invalidated in Johnson, is
related to the suppression of free expression, content-based, and violative
of the first amendment.
With this understanding of Johnson, we can turn to my hypothetical
"flag impairment" statute, which would prohibit any person knowingly to
impair the physical integrity of the American flag. Unlike the Texas law
invalidated in Johnson, the flag impairment statute does not refer to
"desecration" and does not turn in any way on whether the proscribed
conduct "will seriously offend" others. Indeed, the flag impairment statute
applies to the individual who burns a flag in private to ignite a fire in his
fireplace as well as to the individual who burns a flag in public to protest
government policy. It applies without regard to whether the conduct takes
place in public or in private, without regard to whether it is undertaken for
expressive or for other purposes, without regard to whether it offends
others, and without regard to the particular message any individual may
seek to convey. Unlike the Texas law invalidated in Johnson, the hypothetical statute does not turn on the communicative impact of the prohibited
conduct, it is not content-based, it is not related to the suppression of free
38. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540.
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expression, and its constitutionality is not controlled by the principles that
quite correctly dictated the outcome in Johnson. Put simply,Johnson does not
govern the constitutionality of the hypothetical statute.
III
This is not to say, of course, that my hypothetical flag impairment
statute is constitutional. There are at least three grounds on which one
might question the constitutionality of this legislation.
First, even if this statute is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression and neutral with respect to content, it may still violate the first
amendment as an impermissible content-neutral restriction of speech. A
law that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and neutral as to
content may be immune from the "most exacting scrutiny" required of most
content-based restrictions, but it is not immune from constitutional challenge entirely. Even content-neutral laws may violate the first amendment
if their restrictive impact on the opportunities for free expression outweighs the legitimate governmental interests they serve. In general, however, the Court has tended to apply relatively deferential standards of
review in cases involving content-neutral restrictions, and this is especially
true where, as in the case of my hypothetical statute, the restriction has only
an incidental effect on speech.3 9 The closest analogy is, of course, O'Brien.
Indeed, assuming that the government has a constitutionally legitimate
interest in protecting the physical integrity of the flag, a question I will
address in a moment, O'Brien strongly suggests that my hypothetical statute
would withstand content-neutral review.
A second possible objection turns on the issue of impermissible
legislative motivation. I have no doubt that if my hypothetical flag impairment statute were enacted in a cynical effort to circumventJohnson and to
suppress the use of the flag to express ideas that are offensive to the
American people, the legislation could not constitutionally be enacted.
Perhaps ironically, then, if such legislation were in fact enacted for such
constitutionally impermissible reasons, the Court would not necessarily
invalidate it on that basis, for although the Court has often inquired into
the motivation underlying executive and administrative dedisions, 40 it has
generally declined to inquire into the motivation underlying legislative
actions. In O'Brien, for example, the Court, largely for prudential reasons,
refused to inquire into legislative motivation to determine whether the
actual purpose of the draft card statute was to facilitate the administration
of the draft or to punish those individuals who opposed the selective service
system by burning their draft cards. 4 1 If this aspect of O'Brien governs, the
39. See generally Stone, supra note 11.
40. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 412 U.S. 189 (1973) (involving finding of Denver
School Board's de jure segregation); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (local
administration using facially neutral ordinance intentionally discriminated against Chinese
nationals).
41. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
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Court would be similarly reluctant to inquire into the motivations underlying the hypothetical legislation. 42 The more interesting question, however, is whether the hypothetical flag impairment statute does, indeed, have
a constitutionally legitimate purpose.
That brings me to the third possible objection, which may be stated as
follows: What, precisely, is the purpose of this legislation? If it is not
designed merely to circumventJohnson and to suppress the use of the flag
for the expression of offensive opinions, what is it designed to do? Is there,
indeed, any legitimate justification for this legislation that is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression?
The simple answer, of course, is that the hypothetical statute is
designed not to censor critics of the flag or of the nation, but to protect the
physical integrity of the flag itself. It is designed, in other words, to preserve
the flag as an unalloyed symbol of our nationhood and national unity and
to prevent any physical damage to the flag that might dilute its symbolic
power. In the words of the Texas statute, the
purpose of the legislation is
43
to establish the flag as a "venerated" object.
Is this a legitimate governmental purpose? Is it, in itself, violative of
the first amendment? Johnson, Goguen, Spence, and Street clearly establish
that the government cannot constitutionally preserve the flag's symbolic
value by prohibiting others from using it to express unpatriotic or otherwise
offensive messages. 44 Does it necessarily follow, however, that the government may not attempt to preserve the symbolic value of the flag by
protecting its physical integrity against all impairments, whether or not they
are expressive and without regard to the content of any particular message?
In what sense is that a constitutionally illegitimate purpose?
Several arguments might be advanced. First, one might argue that, by
prohibiting anyone to impair the physical integrity of the flag, my hypothetical statute should be understood as an effort to promote government
speech by prohibiting anyone from "interrupting" such speech. But this
hardly establishes the purpose as illegitimate. The first amendment prohibits the government neither from speaking, nor from speaking effectively, nor from speaking patriotically, nor from protecting its speech-pabasis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.").
42. At least in the religion area, the Court in recent years has been increasingly willing to
invalidate legislation because of constitutionally impermissible legislative motivation. See, e.g.,
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating Alabama statute authorizing one minute at
beginning of school day "for meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (Kentucky statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments on classroom walls held
unconstitutional). In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), the Court invalidated
Louisiana's "Creationism Act." The Act required that whenever evolution or creationism is
taught, "the other must also be taught." Id. at 581. The stated purpose of the legislation was
to " 'assure academic freedom.' " Id. at 600 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Appendix to
briefs). Justice Brennan's opinion, however, asserts that "[w]hile the Court is normally
deferential to a state's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such
purpose be sincere." Id. at 586-87. It is at least possible that the Court eventually will extend
these precedents to the free expression area as well.
43. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2537 n.1 (1989).
44. For a discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
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triotic or otherwise-from interruption. There is simply nothing here that
can be said, in and of itself, to violate the first amendment.
Second, one might argue that this statute is invalid not because it
protects government speech from interruption, but because it does so in a
discriminatory manner. On this view, my hypothetical flag impairment
statute might be analogized to a law prohibiting any person from interrupting "patriotic" speeches. Such a law would, of course, violate the first
amendment because it explicitly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. Is
the flag impairment statute similarly invalid because it protects the flag
without equally protecting all other symbols, such as the Republican
elephant, the Nazi swastika, the Union Jack, and the hammer and sickle?45
I think not. Government speech is different from private speech. It
serves different functions. It is not at all clear that the government must
provide the same protection to private speech as it provides its own.
Suppose, for example, a town council regularly posts the minutes of its
meetings on a kiosk in the town square and prohibits anyone from
removing, destroying, or defacing these minutes. Must the town provide
the same protection to all notices that are posted on the kiosk or, for that
matter, in the town? If the government grants landmark status to Independence Hall, must it grant similar status to the building in which the Socialist
Workers Party drafted its first constitution? Laws that, accord special
protection to governmental symbols cannot fairly be equated to contentbased restrictions favoring "patriotic" speech. The problems of government
speech and government symbols are simply too complex to be governed by
so easy an analogy.
Third, one might argue that if the purpose of my hypothetical flag
impairment statute is to preserve the symbolic value of the flag, the only
acts of physical impairment that would actually undermine that purpose
are those that are designed to convey a different and inconsistent message.
Other acts of physical impairment, such as the use of the flag to light a fire
in one's fireplace, would not dilute the flag's symbolic value and could not
rationally be brought within the scope of the law's prohibition. On this view,
the statute would clearly seem to be "related to the suppression of free
expression," for only acts of physical impairment that involve speech would
threaten the government's interest.
It is not at all clear, however, that the flag's status as a symbolic or
venerated object would be impaired only by its use to convey inconsistent
messages. Certainly there are religious groups who proscribe the physical
impairment of venerated objects without regard to either the expressive
purpose of the object or the expressive intent of the individual who defaces
it. Moreover, one can readily understand why the government might want
to prohibit impairment of the physical integrity of the flag, whether or not
the impairment consists of express conduct.
Suppose Congress decides that because the bald eagle is the symbol of
the United States no one should be allowed to kill bald eagles. (Suppose also
that there is no shortage of bald eagles, so the example is not complicated
45. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1503-08 (1975).
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by any concern about preserving the bald eagle as an endangered species.)
Against this background, is a law that prohibits any person from knowingly
killing a bald eagle violative of the first amendment because it furthers a
constitutionally illegitimate purpose? What is the illegitimate purpose?
Surely the law is not designed to suppress anyone's expression, for so far as
I know no one has ever killed a bald eagle as a symbolic expression of
opposition to government policy. Indeed, from this perspective, the law is
clearly no more "related to the suppression of free expression" than the
draft card law upheld in O'Brien.
It is no doubt troubling-at least to me-that the government might
want to establish the bald eagle as a venerated object. But I can think of no
sound reason for concluding that it is constitutionally illegitimate for the
government to do this.46 The government can legitimately speak without
violating the first amendment, it can legitimately speak patriotically without
violating the first amendment, it can legitimately employ symbols of
patriotism without violating the first amendment, and it can legitimately
of patriotism so long as its purpose
prohibit the destruction of such symbols
47
is not to restrict anyone else's expression.
If the bald eagle statute serves a legitimate government interest, it
would seem to follow that the hypothetical flag impairment statute may
serve a constitutionally legitimate interest as well. Indeed, the only distinction is that in the bald eagle situation we can perhaps more readily accept
as plausible the government's claim that its actual purpose is to protect the
symbol rather than to suppress expression, whereas in the flag situation we
are, at a minimum, suspicious of the sincerity of this claim. In light of
O'Brien, however, this is most likely a distinction without constitutional
implications.
I would like to add two final points. First, I do not mean to suggest that
I favor the enactment of my hypothetical statute. To the contrary, it would
be thoroughly impractical, it would restrict a useful means of expression for
little reason, and it would almost certainly be adopted for constitutionally
impermissible .reasons. My effort here is to explore the rather different
question whether such a law, however inadvisable, might nonetheless be
constitutional.

46. I would reject as frivolous the argument that such a law would violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
47. It is possible, of course, that the bald eagle statute might some day be invoked to
punish an individual who shoots a bald eagle in symbolic protest of American foreign policy.
But that is not unconstitutional, for the effect is wholly incidental and is clearly governed by
O'Brien. It is also possible that the government might eventually declare so many symbols of
national unity to be "venerated" objects that, in cumulation, this would have a serious effect on
the opportunities for free expression. For example, the government might declare not only
the bald eagle, but also the flag, the visage of the President, copies of the Constitution, and all
pictures of the Capitol, the White House, and the Supreme Court to be "venerated" objects.
The inability of citizens to impair the physical integrity of all these objects in symbolic protest
of government policy might have a serious, even if only incidental, effect on the overall
opportunities for free expression. But the answer to this concern, in this as in related contexts
involving incidental restrictions of speech, is to deal with the problem if and when we come to
it. In any event, this concern goes only to the constitutionality of the law as a content-neutral
restriction of speech. It does not go to the legitimacy of the government's interest.

HeinOnline -- 75 Iowa L. Rev. 121 1989-90

75

IOWA LAW REVIEW

ill

[19891

Second, I should point out that the legislation actually enacted by
Congress in response to Johnson does not pose quite as clean an issue as my
hypothetical statute. Rather than prohibiting any person from impairing
the physical integrity of the flag, the actual legislation prohibits any person
to mutilate, deface, defile, burn, maintain on the floor or ground, or
trample upon any flag of the United States.4 8 Although this legislation
avoids the most serious difficulties of the Texas statute-it is not directed
explicitly at expression, it does not turn on communicative impact, and it is
not concerned with the extent to which others find the expression offensive-it does employ phrases that are ideologically charged and that carry
at least some of the same connotations as "desecration." Thus, the legislation actually enacted well might be brought within the scope ofJohnson even
though, like my hypothetical statute, it avoids the more flagrant deficiencies
of the Texas flag desecration statute.

IV
I would like to conclude with a few thoughts on the constitutional
amendment that the Bush Administration proposed in its effort to override
Johnson. The proposed amendment provided that "Congress and the States
shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the Flag of the
United States. '49 Congress rightly rejected this proposal. 50

48. Act of Oct. 28, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 700). The legislation states in relevant part:
(a)(1) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains
on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(2)This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag
when it has become worn or soiled.
(b) As used in this section, the term "flag of the United States" means any flag of
the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size, in a form
that is commonly displayed.
(d)(1) An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States
from any interlocutory or finaljudgment, decree, or order issued by a United States
district court ruling upon the constitutionality of subsection (a).
(2) The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on the question, accept
jurisdiction over the appeal and advance on the docket and expedite to the greatest
extent possible.
Id.
The legislation became law without the signature of President Bush. See U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 7, cl.
2 (stating in relevant part: "If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten
Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law,
in like Manner as if he had signed it").
49. S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
50. The proposed amendment failed to pass the Senate on Oct. 19, 1989. See 142 Cong.

Rec. S13,733 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1§89) (51 for, 48 against); see also Toner, Senate Rejects
Amendment Outlawing Flag Desecration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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Before I offer my reasons for that conclusion, however, I would like to
address two arguments that were made against the amendment that I
found quite unpersuasive. First, it was argued that, if enacted, the proposed
amendment would effectively have amended not only the first amendment,
as interpreted in Johnson, but all other constitutional provisions as well,
including the fourth amendment, 51 the self-incriminatipn clause, 52 the due
process clause,5 3 and the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 54 Thus, on
this view, the proposed amendment, if enacted, would have authorized
legislation allowing searches for evidence of flag desecration based on less
than probable cause, denying flag desecration defendants the right to
counsel and inflicting the death penalty on flag desecrators. This is sheer
nonsense. The proposed amendment was explicitly and unambiguously
designed to overrule Johnson. It was not understood as, and would not be
interpreted as, a broadscale obliteration of the other protections of the
Constitution in prosecutions for flag desecration.
Second, it was argued that the proposed amendment would fail to
achieve its explicit objective, for it would appropriately be construed by the
Court as incorporating existing law-including the decision in Johnson. In
light of the unambiguous background of the proposed amendment, I find
this argument unpersuasive in the extreme.
There were, however, sound reasons to reject the proposed constitutional amendment. First, and most narrowly, given a choice between a
legislative response to Johnson and a constitutional amendment, the legislative route was in every respect the more sound. The Supreme Court has
long been guided by the general principle that it should not address
constitutional questions unless it cannot otherwise resolve the dispute
before it. 5 This recognition of the power ofjudicial review has well served
the Court. The same principle should govern in this situation as well. If
51. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
52. The self-incrimination clause is found in the fifth amendment and states: "No person
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend.
V.I
53. The due process clause is found in the fifth amendment and states: "No person shall
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend.
V.
54. The cruel and unusual punishment clause is found in the eighth amendment and
states: "cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
55. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The
Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.' " (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of

Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct.
3040, 3060-61 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

("Where there is no need to decide a constitutional question, it is a venerable principle of this
Court's adjudicatory processes not to do so"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (courts "do not review issues,

especially constitutional issues, until they have to").
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Congress can address a problem through legislative action, it should
ordinarily pursue the legislative solution before resorting to the more
solemn processes of constitutional amendment.
Second, even if the Court eventually holds that there is no method by
which the government can constitutionally protect the physical integrity of
the flag through legislation, a constitutional amendment to overrule
Johnson would be undesirable because Johnson itself was premised upon
sound principles of constitutional theory. The "bedrock" principle that
government should not "prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable" 56 is not only a correct
interpretation of the first amendment, it is wise public policy in a free and
self-governing society. An amendment that would carve that principle from
the Constitution would ultimately weaken rather *than strengthen our
constitutional order.
Third, even if this "bedrock" principle, as applied to flag desecration,
is not a necessary predicate of democratic government, the amendment
would still be unwarranted, for as important as the flag may be, and as
offensive as desecration of the flag may be, a constitutional amendment to
narrow the protections of the first amendment would be wholly unprecedented in the two hundred years of our constitutional history-and for
good reason. The Constitution is our fundamental charter of government.
We should not tamper with it to adjust for what must fairly be understood
as matters of only secondary importance in the overall scheme of American
government. We have not in the past, and we should not in the present,
submit to the temptation to invoke the processes of constitutional amendment to override a decision of the Supreme Court just because it offends
-or even deeply offends-a substantial majority of our citizens. Such a
practice would clutter, trivialize, and, indeed, denigrate the Constitution.
We should recognize the flag issue for what it is-a profoundly controversial and inflammatory dispute over what in the grand scheme of constitutional government is ultimately a matter of secondary importance. It does
not warrant resort to the most profoundly solemn act our nation can
pursue-amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

56. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544.
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